introduction
This article focuses on property crime directed against private individuals or households, the response of victims to crime, the effect of the income distribution on the crime level, the distribution of crime among households, and the distribution and effect of private effort against crime.
While private demand and supply for protection against crime is not uncommon, in many countries this protection is mostly of a passive nature, whereas the active fight against crime is the job of the public police. However, in a high-crime environment with an under-supplied police force, high inequality, and many high-income citizens, private security companies which offer the service of a regular police to paying customers can flourish. As of 2009, more than 375,000 private security officers are active in South Africa, 1 working for 6,392 private security providers.
2 These private security officers and the armed response vehicles of private security companies outnumber the members of the public South African Police Service (SAPS) and police vehicles by 3:1 (Goodenough 2007) . Of the private security companies, 1,181 are registered as "active armed response businesses" as of 2007. According to surveys, South Africans trust the private security industry far more than they trust the SAPS (Prinsloo and Marais 2006) . The pioneering work in the economic analysis of crime is due to Becker (1968) . He treats criminals as rational individuals who decide to become criminal solely based on expected utility. He uses a social welfare function to derive optimal policies that minimize the cost of crime to society. A rather short section of his paper is devoted to private expenditures against crime, and the supply side of protection is not explicitly modelled. While Becker's work inspired many empirical tests of its implications and further theoretical discussions about crime (e.g. Ehrlich 1973 , Ehrlich 1975 , Block and Heineke 1975 , Witte 1980 , Ehrlich 1996 , Corman and Mocan 2000 , Di Tella and Schargrodsky 2004 , the analysis of private demand and supply for protection and its effects has received less attention. Becker and Stigler (1974) , Landes and Posner (1975) , and Polinsky (1980) discuss the possibilities of private law enforcement when enforcers receive a fraction of the fine paid by the criminals; see also Friedman (1984) . Effects of private precautions against crime have been considered by Clotfelter (1978) , Shavell (1991) , Ben-Shahar and Harel (1995) , and Helsley and Strange (1999) .
One argument for a public tax-financed police force is that protection against crime is a human right, and that therefore the supply of security for citizens, independent of their income, is a prime task for any state. An effective executive is also a cornerstone of any functioning state. Besides arguments from ethics and jurisprudence, supplying protection might exhibit increasing returns to scale, leading to a natural monopoly; and one might argue that, given the delicate nature of the business, it is best left to the state. However, as in the case of South Africa, there is evidence that suggests that the security industry can be quite competitive.
Economic theory predicts that higher inequality can lead to more crime, based on opportunity costs and incentives. We might also expect exposure to property crime to be relatively higher among richer households than among poorer households because richer individuals are more attractive targets. The empirical evidence for these predictions is somewhat mixed: For example, Witt et al. (1999) find that inequality increases crime; Kelly (2000) finds that inequality has no effect on property crime, but poverty has a positive effect; Choe (2008) finds a strong and robust effect of relative income inequality on burglary; Neumayer (2005) does not find a strong effect of income inequality on theft. Di Tella et al. (2002) find that for home robberies victims of increased crime levels in Argentina have mostly been poor, whereas both rich and poor have suffered similar increases in victimization for street robberies; Witt et al. (1999) find that availability of "thievable property" increases crime; Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta (2005) find that the effect of neighbourhood affluence as measured by real estate value has no significant effect on crime and that burglars do not show an apparent preference for wealthy neighbourhoods; Demombynes and Berk (2005) show that burglary rates in South Africa are higher in wealthier police jurisdictions and that burglars travel to neighborhoods with higher expected returns; Evans (1989: 93-94) summarizes evidence which suggests that burglars even prefer low-status neighbourhoods.
One possible reason for these mixed results is that (potential) victims of crime respond to crime rates by appropriate precautions against crime, partly to directly protect their property, partly to deter crime in the first place and perhaps to shift crime to other, less protected, individuals. For example, Di Tella et al. (2002) present evidence that rich households are better able to protect their homes through private security; Collett-Schmitt (2007) finds that burglar alarms have a significant and negative effect on burglary rates. Gonzalez-Navarro (2008) finds that while the introduction of the vehicle tracking technology Lojack for certain publicly know car types in some Mexican states reduced theft for Lojack cars by 55%, most of this reduction in theft was offset by increased theft in neighbouring states.
The idea that individual precautions can shift crime from those who invest in private security to those who do not is not new to the theoretical literature (e.g. Clotfelter 1978 , Shavell 1991 . The case of South Africa suggests that this effect can be real, and can increase social inequality in a heterogeneous society. Goodenough (2007) quotes the manager of the South African municipality of eThekwini:
Distances, both social and physical, then divide people even further and the more resourced group decides to spend more money on privatized security. The poor in turn become more reliant on a security force whose members are often paid less than that of the private sector.
Similarly, Irish (1999) notes that in South Africa
[t]he expansion of private security involvement, such as patrolling the neighbourhoods of those who can afford it, has the effect of creating 'enclaves' . There may be a reduction in crime in an enclave, but this does not lead to an overall reduction in crime.
The model of Barenboim and Campante (2008) suggests that the (possible) causality between inequality and crime can also be inverted; in fact they show empirically that partly due to emigration crime can increase inequality.
In this article, crime is modelled as a game with a measure space of players with different legal income. Richer victims yield a higher return on crime, but the return to crime directed against a particular income type decreases as more criminals target that income type. Private security providers offer protection against crime and face Cournot competition. The model allows for the analysis of market clearing prices for effort against crime. Some of the implications of the model are that rising inequality will lead to more expenditure on protection against crime, and that the upper income classes are suffering from the same or lower crime density than the middle income class. Taking into account the response of criminals and victims, rising inequality can actually lead to less crime if either (i) the legal income opportunity of the marginal criminal increases or (ii) marginal utility from income decreases and richer individuals spend a higher proportion of their income on protection (i.e. protection is a superior good). Often the middle class suffers from higher crime densities as inequality increases, as the increased spending on protection by the upper class (i) shifts crime to the middle class and (ii) increases market prices for protection, leaving the middle class with less affordable protection against crime. Emigration of the middle class can then further increase inequality. This highlights the importance of taking into account the response of individuals against crime and shows that the link between inequality and crime is a complex one.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow. Section 2 introduces the basic setup of an economy with a measure space of individuals and the utility functions characterizing them. It is shown that an equilibrium crime distribution exists, that poor individuals supplement their income with crime, while rich individuals do not, that inequality tends to increase crime but this is not a necessity, that higher income of high income types can decrease the harm from crime suffered by poor and intermediate income types and vice versa. Section 3 introduces private security companies which supply the economy with effort against crime. They face Cournot-competition; the model allows in principle to analyse market clearing prices for security. It shows that an equilibrium exists; that richer individuals will demand more effort than poorer individuals; that individuals for whom it is optimal not to demand effort never benefit and often suffer from the private provision of security; that effort against crime is a superior good and an increase in income of rich individuals will increase the market price for effort, leaving poor and intermediate income types worse off than before.
2 the basic setup
Preliminaries
We consider a non-atomic economy with a population that consists of a continuum of individuals (or players), given by the unit interval Q = [0, 1] endowed with Lebesgue measure μ. Individuals have a certain legal income y ∈ R + , which we will also refer to as the income type of an individual. Income is distributed according to a (cumulative) distribution function F ∶ R + → [0, 1], i.e F(y) represents the proportion of individuals with income less than or equal to y. A function Y ∶ Q → R + is referred to as the income distribution, with Y q = F −1 (q) = inf y {y ∶ F(y) ≥ q}, i.e. Y q gives the income of the individual at q ∈ Q. We will also refer to a q ∈ Q as the income type, meaning income Y q , when the meaning is clear. Note that the density at every q is unity. Let D denote the set of all income distributions. Individuals have a strategy set A = Q ∪ {−1}. A strategy a ∈ Q is interpreted as becoming a criminal and stealing from individuals of income type a to supplement the legal income. The strategy a = −1 is interpreted as not becoming a criminal. For a clearer exposition, we will denote A C = Q. Let M be the set of Borel probability measures on A.
Each individual is characterized by a utility function U ∶ A × M → R; let U be the set of all utility functions. Given the strategy a q ∈ A chosen by the individual q and the strategy distribution ν of all individuals, U q (a q , ν) represents the utility of that individual. A game of crime is then characterized by a Borel measure μ on U.
Let χ be a Borel measure on U × A, and let χ U and χ A denote the marginals of χ on U and A, respectively. We interpret
as the crime density at income type a, and c * = 1 − χ A (−1) as the crime rate.
The Utility Functions
Before we specify the utility functions of the individuals, we adopt a simplifying informal assumption to keep the model tractable: The income from stealing will be referred to as the crime payoff or simply payoff to avoid confusion with the (legal) income. The payoff from stealing of individuals of income type q depends on their income Y q and the crime density at q. This payoff can be represented by a continuous integrable function S ∶ Q × R + → R + . We use the shorthand notation S a for the payoff of strategy a ∈ A C whenever the meaning is clear.
Individuals of type q will experience disutility from criminal activity directed against them, i.e. from individuals who choose strategy a = q. This disutility depends on the crime density at q and can be represented by a continuous function H ∶ Q → R + . We use the shorthand notation H q whenever the meaning is clear.
We assume that individuals who choose a strategy a ∈ A C are apprehended and arrested with a fixed probability p ∈ (0, 1). If arrested, they lose their legal income and payoff from crime and suffer from a punishment represented by ψ ∈ R + .
We can now specify the utility for each type and each strategy. Let u ∶ Q × R → R + be a continuous increasing function representing utility from legal income Y q and criminal payoff, strictly increasing in Y q and S a . We use the shorthand notation u q (a) for u(Y q , S a ) if the meaning is clear. Then
Thus, H represents disutility from crime in terms of units of utility from income and payoff. By definition the density at every individual q ∈ Q equals unity, thus Note that Assumption 2 is not a simplification of the model; in particular, M = ∅ is possible.
So far, we have specified the primitives of the model in quite general terms, but we will impose several assumptions. The first two assumptions concern the crime payoff: Payoff is increasing and convex in the income of the target victim type, and decreasing and convex in the crime density at the target victim type; furthermore, every income in A M yields enough payoff to "support" a positive measure of criminals targeting that type.
Assumption 3. For all a ∈
Assumption 4. For every δ > 0 and a, a
We also adopt an assumption which guarantees that a set of individuals of measure greater than zero choose a ∈ A C in equilibrium, and that the crime density is strictly positive on M.
Assumption 5. There exists an ε > 0 and a q
The next assumption concerns the disutility from crime.
Assumption 6. If the set of individuals who choose strategy a ∈ A C has measure zero (i.e., χ A (a) = 0), individuals of income type a experiences no disutility: H(a) = 0. For all a ∈ A C , H a is a continuous and convave function, strictly increasing in χ
The function u is a quite general form for utility derived from legal income and criminal payoff. We will now adopt more assumptions about its form which are standard in economics.
Assumption 7. We have ∂u(y, S)/∂y
We distinguish between assumptions and conditions. If a condition is assumed to hold, it will be explicitly noted.
Condition 1. The function S satisfies S(Y
a , χ A [a]) = R(Y a )/χ A (a), where R ∶ R + → R + is strictly increasing in Y a .
Condition 2. The function R is an affine transformation of Y: R(y)
= β y + γ, with β ∈ (0, 1) and γ ∈ R.
Remark 3. If γ > 0 we will necessarily have S a > 0 for all a ∈ A C , i.e. m = 0 and M = ∅.
Condition 3. The function u only depends on the sum of legal income and criminal payoff: u(y, S) = u(y + S, 0).

Condition 4. The function H is an identity function, i.e. H(χ
a [q]) = χ a (q).
The Income Distribution and Inequality
Given the definition of income distributions in Section 2.1, an income distribution Y ∈ D is already the inverse of a cumulative distribution function. Let
The Lorenz curve can be used to define a partial ordering ≿ Lo ⊆ D × D, called the Lorenz ordering:
The
Equilibrium
We can now define the equilibrium of a game. Schmeidler 1973 , Mas-Colell 1984 , Rath 1992 Next, we will briefly summarize and proof some fairly obvious results.
Definition 1. For a game μ, a Borel measure χ on U × A with marginals χ U and χ A is an equilibrium crime distribution if we have
(i) χ U = μ and (ii) χ({(U, a) ∶ U(a, χ A ) ≥ U(a ′ , χ A )∀a ′ ∈ A}) = 1.
Remark 5. Proposition 1 is a special case of very general theorems about the existence of equilibria in non-atomic games (see
Result 1. If χ is an equilibrium crime distribution, then (i) χ
Proof Suppose that χ is an equilibrium crime distribution, and
, this is a contradiction.
Result 2. In any equilibrium, χ
Proof Suppose χ is an equilibrium crime distribution and
The next result implies that there is "marginal criminal", and that only the poorest players become criminals.
Result 3. Suppose χ is an equilibrium crime distribution. Then
for all a ∈ A C ; the equivalence also hold for strict inequality.
Lemma 1. The following statements are true in equilibrium:
Lemma 2. The following statements are true in equilibrium:
Proof of Lemma 2 It is sufficient to show that in equilibrium 
Informally, rising inequality is interpreted as "the rich get richer" and "the poor get poorer". Because lower income of "poor" individuals will increase the difference of the utilities from choosing a ∈ A C and a = −1, i.e. (1 − p)u q (a) − u q (−1), it seems natural that rising inequality increases the crime rate. This is not necessarily the case, as we have to consider the legal income of the marginal criminal. The next result illustrates this. 
and unchanged average and total income. It can be
with β ∈ (0, 1) (i.e. Conditions 1 and 2 hold with γ = 0) and
There exist β, p ∈ (0, 1) and ψ ≥ 0 such that individual of income type q * 1 is indeed the marginal criminal for the income distribution Y 1 . Given the assumptions on S a and u q above, S a, 1 = S a, 2 if q * 1 = q * 2 because total income remains unchanged. But for equilibrium crime distributions χ A, 1 and χ A, 2 we must
Figure 1: A less equal income distribution can lead to a lower crime rate, even if it Lorenzdominates. 
Remark 6. Assuming S(Y
a , χ A [a]) = β Y a /χ A (a) and u(Y q , S a ) = Y a + S
Further Results
It light of Result 4, we would like to know under what circumstances a change in the income distribution leads to a higher crime rate. In general, we can distinguish two effects of changes of the income distribution: The effect on the legal income of individuals at the margin between choosing crime and no crime, and the effect on the payoff to crime. Because the crime rate is determined by the q which solves
, an increase in Y q decreases the incentives to become criminal, and an increase in overall income can (but not necessarily does) increase S, leading to an increase in the incentives to become criminal. The latter effect is not necessarily positive because if income is partly shifted from individuals from which is it more efficient to steal (with high ∂S/∂Y) to individuals from which is it less efficient (individuals in [0, m] or with low ∂S/∂Y), total "stealable income" actually decreases. Thus, to avoid this problem and simplify the analyis, we will invoke Conditions 1 and 2.
If Condition 1 holds, we defineS as
note thatS is independent of q.
Result 5. Suppose Condition 1 holds. Then in equilibriumS = S a and χ
Proof With
The result states that in equilibrium, the crime distribution is determined by R up to a multiplicative constant (given the overall crime level). 
(ii) Suppose c * 1 = c * 2 , and we have S a,1 > S a,2 . Thus
but for small enough ε 1 and ε 2 , we have
Another interesting result is that if an increase in income of some individuals of measure greater than zero leads to increase in the crime rate, it will increase the overall crime less than the crime density at these types, thus reducing the crime density at other types. 
We summarize the main results of this section in the following (informal) proposition:
Proposition 2. There exists an equilibrium crime distribution which equalizes payoff of stealing from any income type for which stealing is profitable at all. There exists a marginal criminal: All individuals with lower income supplement their income with crime, while all individuals with higher income do not commit crimes. Inequality tends to increase crime by (i) lowering the income of poorer individuals and/or (ii) increasing "stealable income"; however, for (i) it matters whether the income of the marginal criminal is among the incomes which decrease; it is possible to find examples for which higher inequality actually leads to less crime. Higher income of high income types can decrease the harm from crime suffered by poor and intermediate income types: Even though crime increases, the crime targeted at high income types increases by more than overall crime, thus shifting some of the crime from poor and intermediate types to the rich.
An Example
A short example based on the Singh-Maddala (1976) income distribution, which is given by
may be helpful to understand the basic model. We will only focus on a oneparameter case, namely 
To keep the example simple, we assume that u(y, S) = y + S, S a = β Y a /χ A (a), ψ = 0, and M = {}. Then the aggregate amount of criminal payoff is simply given by ∫ a∈A C β Y a d a, and
Using Result 5, we have that S a =S for all a ∈ A C , and we know that the the marginal criminal q * is given by the q which solves
The crime distribution can be computed as Figure 2: The equilibrium crime density for α ∈ {3/2, 2, 5/2, 3} without private security (β = 1/10, p = 1/2).
Discussion
The result that, loosely speaking, "all of the poor and none of the rich are criminals", is of course a result of the simplifications of the model and not realistic. One the one hand, the model does not consider white collar crimes like tax fraud. On the other hand, the model assumes complete homogeneity of attitudes towards crime.
3 An obvious extension of this section would be to add a dimension to the type space to account for heterogeneous "corruptedness" of individuals. In the simplest case, we could consider two sub-populations such that all members of one sub-population consider crime as a possible option without any moral concerns, whereas members of the other sub-population are incorruptible and exclude crime from their considerations; these individuals would be dummy players with a strategy space consisting only of the strategy −1. A more sophisticated approach would consider an additional continuous type-dimension, e.g. Z = [0, 1] such that payoff from crime is discounted according to z ∈ Z; say, u(y, S) = y + z S. The (marginal) distribution on Z could also depend on the income type. Another generalization would be to consider a correlation between legal income opportunity and payoff from crime; if skill and education determine legal income, these factors could also affect illegal income. Some of the assumptions made so far deserve at least a brief discussion. The assumptions that payoff from crime cannot be stolen again and that disutility from crime does not involve loss of income are obviously unrealistic. Remark 1 briefly gives a reason for the first assumption. Remark 2 explains the concept of harm from crime and that we think of income Y as "net of theft". Note that payoff from crime will be equal for all individuals who decide to become criminals. If, say, u(y, S) = v(y + S), with v being a usual Bernoulli utility function, then crime will somewhat raise and equalize total income among lower income types. If that income could be stolen again, some crime would shift from higher income types to the lower (criminal) income types. If loss of income due to theft would also decrease utility from income, crime may either increase marginally (due to higher incentives via loss of income) or decrease marginally (due to lower extra income from crime and the increased harm that comes with increased income). Overall, the major results would remain qualitatively unchanged.
Another assumptions which simplifies the model is that legal income is supplemented by criminal income. And alternative and perhaps more usual setup would have individuals decide how much of their time to devote to legal work and crime, which would also add another dimension to the strategy space. However, with the assumption that criminal payoff cannot be stolen, individuals could then prefer crime over legal work partly because it reduces the harm suffered from crime (see also Remark 2). The current specification avoids this problem. The model still produces the intuitive result that a higher legal income reduces incentives to become criminal because of increasing opportunity costs (i.e. legal income) and decreasing returns to crime.
3 private security
Preliminaries
After the basic model has been set up in Section 2, we will now introduce a new type of player, a private security company (PSC). We let n ∈ N be the total number of PSCs on the market and denote N = {1, . . . , n}. A PSC ℓ ∈ N offers a certain amount of effort e ℓ ∈ R + against crime, which he tries to sell at a price ρ ℓ ∈ R + . For the provision of an amount e ℓ of effort, the PSC incurs costs, given by a continuous and strictly increasing variable cost function k ℓ ∶ R + → R + with k ℓ (0) = 0. We denote e = (e 1 , . . . , e ℓ ) the vector of efforts provided by the PSCs. Withn ≥ 1 PSCs, we denote e Σ = ∑ ℓ∈N e ℓ the aggregate effort provided. We assume that the effort provided by the PSCs is perfectly substitutable, i.e. there is no difference in quality of effort. PSCs engage in Cournot competition, thus selling at the same market clearing price ρ ℓ = ρ. Thus, their characterizing profit function π ∶ R 2 + → R is given by
Let Π = {π ℓ } n ℓ=1 denote the set of profit functions of all PSCs. Let X = R + ∪ {∞}. An effort allocation is a Lebesgue measurable and integrable function ξ ∶ Q → X that satisfies ∫ q∈Q ξ(q) dq ≤ e Σ . Let Ξ be the set of all effort allocations.
Each individual in characterized by utility function V ∶ A × M × X × Ξ → R. Given the strategy a q ∈ A, the strategy distribution ν of all individuals, and the effort allocation ξ, V q (a q , ν, ξ(q), ξ) represents the utility of that individual. Let V be the set of all utility functions. The economy is then characterized by (μ, Π), where μ is a (Borel) measure on V, i.e. a game of crime.
The Utility Functions
As before, the payoff from stealing of individuals of income type q depends on their income Y q and the crime density at q, but now it also depends on ξ(q). This payoff can be represented by a continuous function S ∶ Q × R + × X → R + .
We assume that the effort against crime purchased will not directly reduce the disutility from criminal activity. It can, however, change the disutility indirectly via a different crime density induced by ξ. We will model the effect of ξ as a transformation of the income that can be stolen; more about this Assumption 3' below.
We can now specify the utility for each type and each strategy.
We assume that individuals cannot spend more than their income Y q on effort against crime, but this is an economic restraint, not a technical one. We adopt all of the assumptions specified in Section 2.2, which easily generalize to the case considered here, except for Assumption 3, for which we adopt Assumption 3' . Let T ∶ R + × R → R + be a continuous measurable integrable function. 
Assumption 3' . It holds that S(Y
For all a ∈ A M and Y a > 0, S a satisfies the following conditions:
Remark 7. The function T transforms the income distribution Y into a new distribution, in a sense reducing the "stealable income", and can be interpreted as a protection technology with decreasing marginal returns.
Assumption 3' gives very general conditions for the transformation of income. One particular form which satisfies the assumptions is given in Condition 5.
Condition 5. The function T satisfies T(y, x) = b
−t x y, with b > 1 and t > 0.
Equilibrium
We can now define the equilibrium of the economy. Let τ be a Borel measure on V × X.
Definition 2. For an economy (μ, Π), a tuple (χ, ξ, ρ, e) is a competitive crimesecurity-equilibrium if (i) χ is an equilibrium crime distribution of the game of crime μ, i.e. χ V = μ and χ({(V
for all e ∈ R + and all ℓ ∈ N. The effort allocation ξ is a symmetric equilibrium effort allocation if additionally we have Proof of Lemma 3 Given the assumptions on T (Assumption 3'), any effort allocationξ transforms Y, leading to a new distribution relevant for the choice of a. It can be easily seen that Proposition 1 holds as before.
The next lemma, while based on a result due to Rath et al. (1995) , is also quite simple (see Remark 8 below). 
That is, there exists a symmetric equilibrium effort allocation.
Proof of Lemma 4
The best reply correspondence B ∶ V → X is given by
Note that Eq. (14) is equivalent to
whenever ξ(q) = 0.
It can be easily seen that given ρ and ξ, the best reply of any individual is a singleton. Thus, B is single-valued. Now, let Rath et al. (1995) show that if X B is closed, a symmetric equilibrium exists. Because B is single-valued, we have that
so X B is trivially closed.
Given the existence of an equilibrium crime distribution and an equilibrium effort allocation for given ρ, a demand or inverse demand function for effort exists. Standard arguments then easily establish an equilibrium vector e. Rath et al. (1995) . The existence of an equilibrium allocation follows directly from existence theorems for non-atomic games (Schmeidler 1973 , Mas-Colell 1984 , Rath 1992 
Remark 8. Lemma 4 is a special case of Theorem 4 in
Proof The first statement is obvious and follows from Result 1.(i). The second statement follows from
and
Eq. (17) is obvious and follows from Assumption 7. Eq. (18) follows from 
Result 8 states that income types which do not attract any crime at all (q ∈ M) will not demand any effort against crime in equilbrium. Furthermore, demand for effort weakly increases in income.
Further Results
Given the basic model in the previous section, we now turn to the implications for the distribution of crime with private security. 
2. if utility from income is strictly concave, either
Proof The proof is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 5. Suppose Condition 5 holds. Then
If additionally Conditions 1 and 2 hold, then in equilibrium we must have
If Conditions 1, 2, 4, and 5 hold, then in equilibrium we must have
Proof of Lemma 5 With T(y, x) = b −t x y (Condition 5), we obtain and Eq. 19 follows. With S(T[Y q , ξ(q) ξ(q) ]/χ A (q) (Conditions 1 and 2) and
. Then with Eq.
19, Eq. 20 follows. Finally, Eq. 21 is obvious. Proof Consider Figure 3 . The first part shows the old and new income distribution with three distinct income types (solid lines), which we will refer to as "the poor", "the middle class' , and "the rich". The income of the poor is below the threshold Y m , i.e. they will not experience harm from crime. Income is then shifted from the poor to the rich, preserving the mean income. Let Y q,2 = Y q,1 + δ be the new income of rich types q. Suppose that the marginal utility from income for the rich is already very low. The increase in income will then lead to an increase in expenditure on effort against crime very close to δ, because (i) the marginal reduction in harm from crime will increase and (ii) the marginal utility from income will decrease (see Figure 3 , lower right). This increase in demand will lead to an increase in the price for security (by Result 10), which can lead the middle class to demand less security (see Figure  3 , lower left).
We have ∂u(Y
We summarize the main results of this section in the following (informal) proposition: 
An Example
It is helpful to continue the example given in Section 2.6. In addition to the previous assumptions, we assume a very convenient form of transformation of Figure 3 : A higher inequality can lead to less crime but a higher crime density for the middle class.
stealable income which satisfies Condition 5: T(y, x) = exp(−x/2) y. Then,
Using Result 9, we know that T (Y a , ξ[a] ) must be the same for all players with positive demand for effort against crime. Let us denote the strategy set which consists of player types with positive demand as (a 0 , 1]. For all a ∈ (a 0 , 1], we must have in equilibrium
for some S 0 > 0, whereξ(a) may be negative. Solving Eq. (23) forξ(a) gives
Settingξ(a) = 0 and solving for a gives a 0 , depending on S 0 . In equilibrium, the aggregate effort allocated to the players (i.e., total demand) must equal total supply of effort:
Solving Eq (25) for S 0 gives the explicit solution
With S 0 given, we can then compute the equilibrium effort allocation as Figure 4 shows the equilibrium effort allocation for different parameters of the income distribution. The marginal criminal q * is indifferent between choosing crime and no crime; thus, q * is the q which solves
With
we can then find, for rational values of α, explicit (though very lengthy) solutions for the equilibrium crime level, the equilibrium crime distribution, and the market price for any given supply of effort e Σ (i.e. the inverse demand function). Figures 5 and 6 show the equilibrium crime distribution for α = 2 and α = 3, respectively, and two different values of e Σ . The figures also show the sum of the harm suffered due to crime density and the expenditure for effort against crime (i.e. the market price ρ time the effort demanded). In this particular example, we can simply add up these two components of the utility function because both utility from income and harm from crime density are identity functions. Figure 7 shows the market price or inverse demand function for effort against crime for α = 2 and α = 3. Consider for example Figure 5. (a). It shows that compared to a situation without private security, the poorest 53% of players will suffer from a higher crime density once private security is introduced. Perhaps even more interestingly, only the richest 17% actually benefit from private security: Players of type q ∈ [.53, .83] do enjoy a lower crime density, but the expenses for private security more than compensate the positive effect. Players of a type q ∈ [.37, .53] do not only suffer from a higher crime density than without private security, they even have positive expenditure on private security.
Comparing Figure 5 .(a) with 5.(b), we see that an increase in supply of effort against crime will reduce the measure of players who are worse off due to private security; however, those who still do not benefit from private security are even worse off. Comparing Figures 5 and6 shows that as inequality decreases (in the sense of the Lorenz ordering), both negative and positive effects of private security are still present but less pronounced.
Discussion
The competition among PSCs could also, and perhaps more realistically, be modelled as Bertrand-competition with capacity choice, which also leads to Cournot-outcomes (Kreps and Scheinkman 1983) .
We have not explicitly modelled emigration. Barenboim and Campante (2008) find that increasing crime levels can lead to the emigration of the middle class, leaving behind only the very poor and the very rich, thus increasing inequality; the rich stay because they can afford privately supplied security. Result 12 suggests that an extension of our model can generate this result as well: An increase in income of high income types can increase the crime density at intermediate income types, leaving them worse off. If this effect is strong enough, higher inequality can push utility of the middle class below a threshold level which triggers emigration. News reports and research 4 suggest that this is indeed an effect of the high crime rates in South Africa, leading skilled middle member of the middle class to leave the country.
discussion
Possible Extensions
Besides explicitly modelling of emigration (see Section 3.6), another interesting extension which would introduce dynamics to game would be to consider social mobility. If social mobility is generally high, i.e. the poor can expect to have higher legal incomes in the near future, this might substantially reduce crime, as the expected opportunity costs would increase. A further generalization of the model would consider individuals being endowed with a time budget which they can spend on normal work (generating the legal income of the model considered here), crime (generating the payoff from crime), and effort against crime which can be sold on the market for a market price ρ. In that case, the increase in the market price caused by increased demand would also reduce crime by increasing opportunity costs: Both security services and crime is "provided" by low income types; higher income from security work would decrease crime.
The increase in the market price for private security can also affect the expenditure and recruitment of the state police. Goodenough (2007) reports that the private security officers in South Africa are often paid more than the regular police. Thus, a higher demand for private security can also lead to a lower level of publicly provided security.
Conclusion
We modelled crime as non-atomic game with decreasing returns to crime as more criminals exploit stealable income. The specification of the model allowed to derive a crime distribution, i.e. a distribution of criminal activity among individuals of different incomes. We showed that there exists an equilibrium crime distribution which equalizes payoff of stealing from any income type for which stealing is profitable at all. There exists a marginal criminal: All individuals with lower income supplement their income with crime, while all individuals with higher income do not commit crimes. Inequality tends to increase crime by (i) lowering the income of poorer individuals and/or (ii) increasing "stealable income"; however, for (i) it matters whether the income of the marginal criminal is among the incomes which decrease; it is possible to find examples for which higher inequality actually leads to less crime. Higher income of high income types can decrease the harm from crime suffered by poor and intermediate income types: Even though crime increases, the crime targeted at high income types increases by more than overall crime, thus shifting some of the crime from poor and intermediate types to the rich.
Introducing private security can substantially change some of the results of the model without private precautions against crime. We showed that there exists a competitive crime-security-equilibrium; in any such equilibrium, the equilibrium effort allocation is symmetric. Demand for effort against crime increases in income, effort against crime is a superior good, and it obeys the law of demand. If marginal utility of income is linear, private security equalizes the crime density among those who demand security in equilibrium. If marginal utility of income is decreasing, crime density increases with income up to the marginal income type who demand zero effort, and then decreases in income. Those who do not demand security in equilibrium will not benefit from the effort against crime demanded by others, and will often suffer from a higher crime density. Increasing inequality can shift crime away from those with increased income to those whose income remains constant.
